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This article revisits Bairoch’s hypothesis that in the late nineteenth century
tariffs were positively associated with growth, as recently confirmed by a
new generation of quantitative studies (see O’Rourke 2000; Jacks 2006;
Clemens and Williamson 2002, 2004). This article highlights the
importance of the structure of protection in the relation between trade
policy and its potential growth-promoting impact. Evidence is based on a
new database on industrial tariffs for the 1870s. The results show that
income, factor endowment and policy independence are important for
explaining regional asymmetries between tariffs and growth. At a global
level, increased protection, measured by total and average tariffs on
manufactures, implied more unskilled inefficient protection and less
growth, and this is especially true for the poor countries in the late
nineteenth century. Protection was only positive for a ‘rich club’ if we
include in this group new settler countries, which grew rapidly in the late
nineteenth century and imposed high tariffs mainly for fiscal reasons.
1. Introduction
In the explanation of economic growth, any attempt to isolate one single
factor among the complex mix is a hard task, and this certainly applies to
the economic impact of commercial policies too. Many economic historians
have supported the idea that during the late nineteenth century protection
was instrumental to the development of continental Europe. Bairoch’s
(1972, 1976, 1989, 1993) hypothesis that tariffs were positively associated
with growth mainly applied to European countries, but it has also been
extended to other high-tariff land-abundant countries like the rich European
offshoots.1
Recent econometric studies carried out by O’Rourke (2000) and Jacks
(2006) tend to confirm propositions regarding the positive correlation
1 This positive relation between tariffs and growth in Europe in the late nineteenth century
has been sustained by many authors, including Milward and Saul (1977) and Pollard
(1982), but notably by Bairoch (1972, 1976, 1989, 1996). For an extended discussion on
the good reputation of late nineteenth-century protectionism, see Tena (2005).
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between tariffs and growth in the late nineteenth century.2 Both works use
a limited sample of 10 countries, mostly rich European or land-abundant
countries with good institutions, and this fact has been criticized, even if
they are more concerned with exploring the variation in the time series
of economic growth than with analysing cross-sectional influence. Other
studies that follow a similar time-series strategy point out that the relationship
between average tariffs and growth (significant or not significant, positive or
negative) depends crucially on the countries included in the sample. A larger
sample of countries has shown that the correlation between tariff average and
growth might vary considerably in different countries, according to different
levels of wealth and degrees of political independence (see Williamson
2006b).3 Likewise, Irwin (2002b) shows that rich land-abundant countries
may be outliers in the relation between tariffs and growth, because they often
relied on customs duties to generate a large proportion of their government
revenue: they tended to impose high tariffs, but without following an import-
substituting extrategy. Tena (2005, 2006) remarks that the rich European
tariff average is often distorted by revenue tariffs not designed to protect
domestic producers, and that we should focus on the relation between
manufacture tariffs and growth.
The most notable feature of this historical literature is its reliance on
economy-wide average measures of protection. On one side, these data are
readily available for a wide variety of countries, and average tariffs are easily
calculated: all one needs to do is to divide total customs revenue by the total
value of imports. On the other side, the simplicity of tariff averages makes it
impossible to reach a deeper understanding of the causal mechanism linking
tariffs and growth. In fact, as De Long (1995) and Irwin (2001a) emphasized
for the late nineteenth century, the central question to investigate here is
how tariffs alter domestic relative prices in order to shift resource allocation
between higher- and lower-productivity sectors. In this case the emphasis
will be put on the dynamics of economies of scale, learning-by-doing, and
technical innovation that various sectors can develop as a consequence of
temporal protection.
2 Even if O’Rourke diverges from Bairoch on many points, it is generally agreed that in the
late nineteenth century tariffs and growth were positively associated: ‘It appears that
Bairoch’s hypothesis (that tariffs were positively associated with growth in the late
nineteenth century) holds remarkably well, when tested with recently available data, and
when controlling for other factors influencing growth’ (O`Rourke 2000, p. 473).
3 O’Rourke (2000, p. 478) remembers that: ‘Lessons from the late nineteenth century core
cannot automatically be extended to the late nineteenth century periphery: as always,
more research on Southern and Eastern Europe, as well as the developing world, should
be high on the agenda of cliometricians.’ For the twentieth century see Dejong and Ripoll
(2006); and for both the nineteenth and twentieth centuries see Clemens and Williamson
(2001, 2004) and Vamvakidis (2002).
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In a very recent paper, Lehman and O’Rourke (2008), asking whether
agricultural and industrial tariffs had the same impact on growth in the late
nineteenth century, found robust evidence that manufacture, rather than
agricultural tariffs, was related to growth. Their paper uses panel data, but
limits the analysis to the same ‘rich countries club’ as O’Rourke (2000).
Also, it focuses on five-year periods, picking up the short- to medium-run
impact of protection rather than the longer-run effects (p. 14).
This article addresses the same issue but differs from the earlier literature
in two respects. Firstly, we focus on the relation between efficient or
inefficient tariff structures and long-run growth; secondly, we pay special
attention to the different levels and geographical diversity of tariff structures
around the world. This approach is made possible because we use a new
and improved database which expands the number of countries, and offers a
much more detailed disaggregation of manufacture tariffs ranked according
to their skill intensity.
The article is structured as follows. The next section provides a general
view of the relevance of the issue of regional asymmetry in the tariff−growth
debate. Section 3 presents the intuitive model which relates tariff structure
and growth, based on total tariff average, industrial tariff average, and the
industrial skill tariff bias. Section 4 describes the sources and the variables
used in the new database employed in this study. Section 5 discusses the main
results of the correlation model, while the last section looks at how, in general,
these results match the model predictions that countries with relatively higher
tariffs in industry grow more slowly, apparently because high-tariff countries
protected the non-skill-intensive sectors more than skill-intensive ones. The
last section provides some concluding remarks, including the relevance of
these findings in rejecting some of the interpretations offered by the previous
literature.
2. Did tariff structure explain regional asymmetries in the
tariff−growth relation?
The starting point is the confirmation and discussion of the regionally
asymmetrical relationships between tariff average and growth discovered by
Williamson et al. The tariff−growth relationship may be ambiguous because
high tariffs in sectors with positive externalities may induce high rates of
growth, while high tariffs in sectors with no positive externalities may induce
low rates of growth. So, in theory, there is no reason to find a systematically
unambiguous relationship between average tariffs and growth in different
groups of countries, and regional asymmetry may be partially explained by
different tariff structures.
This article assumes that in the late nineteenth century the regional
asymmetries were mainly influenced by the starting level of income per
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capita, relative factor abundance and political independence. The division
between rich and poor countries is a general proxy for different economic
structures and institutional factors that may determine both the tariff
structure bias and the relationship between tariffs and growth. Rich nations
in Europe, with good institutions, were able to develop tariff policies
which was less dependent on pressure groups. That would imply moderate
and efficient tariffs on manufactured products.4 The tariff policies of
politically independent poor countries, with less transparent institutions,
weak enforcement of political rights, and lower parliamentary and executive
independence, instead, were more likely to be influenced by lobbies. The
result would be a policy of relatively higher, but more inefficient, tariffs in
industry (biased in favour of non-competitive industrial sectors without pro-
growth effects). Land-abundant new settlers tended to impose high tariffs for
reasons involving public finance and political economy.5 In terms of public
finance, the taxation of imported goods reduced the cost of tax compliance in
relation to other alternatives, and this is especially true for countries with low
population density. Other means of raising revenue (excise taxes, land taxes,
income taxes and the like) simply may not have been as feasible or as easy to
enforce in countries with a widely dispersed population, particularly in the
late nineteenth century. In terms of political economy, if a significant share of
the population owns land (or if the government is controlled by landowners),
they may have the inclination and the opportunity to avoid direct taxes on
land in favour of high taxes on high-revenue-generating imported products
or manufactured luxury goods.6
The picture was very different in the European colonies in Africa and
Asia that implemented typical free-trade policies, normally imposed by
their metropolis. Many of these countries, which had created tightly closed
economies in the mid nineteenth century, became pro-global, low-tariff
countries at the end of the century.7 Even independent countries such as
Japan or China, under British influence, adopted treaties which limited their
4 Core European countries had moderate manufacture tariffs and high revenue tariffs levied
on just a few key primary commodities (such as alcoholic beverages, coffee and tea, sugar
and tobacco). Revenue tariffs may have some protective effects but affect growth
differently than broadly based tariffs designed to protect domestic producers (Tena 2006).
5 This argument is developed by Irwin (2002b). In that paper (figures 3 and 4), Irwin shows
the existence of a clear positive association between land abundance (ratio of productive
land over population) and either trade tax dependence (ratio of customs revenue over total
revenue) or total tariff average. This evidence supports the idea that in these cases, high
tariffs were not based upon an import substitution strategy.
6 See Irwin (2002b) and Be´rtola and Williamson (2006).
7 Following Bairoch (1989), countries like Abyssinia, Afghanistan, China, Iran, Japan,
Liberia, Siam, the Arabian Peninsula and Turkey (Ottoman Empire), which were not
formal colonies at the end of the nineteenth century, shared one important characteristic:
‘“European Powers” obliged them, directly or indirectly, to open up their national
markets’ (p. 155).
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tariffs to 5 per cent in the second half of nineteenth century. Similarly,
other Asian countries, such as India and Indonesia, were forced by their
colonial masters to adopt liberal trade policies. Also in Africa, even if French,
Portuguese and Italian colonies typically discriminated in favour of their
respective colonial power, the progressive extension of European control
resulted, in general terms, in a further diffusion of liberal trade policies at
the end of the nineteenth century.8 This partial exogenous determination of
their commercial policy would reduce the influence of local pressure groups,
which in theory would press for higher tariffs, and would lead to a more
neutral incidence of tariffs on the assignment of resources.9
Consequently, the question of whether a significant relationship between
initial tariff average and growth exists, and whether this relationship is
positive or negative, depends critically on the countries included in the
sample.
In order to assess regional degrees of protection and their relation to
growth we first provide a graphical analysis of the correlation between
the initial degree of protection and the subsequent rate of growth. The
initial tariff average used here, and in previous works, is measured as
customs revenues divided by the total value of imports for the years
1865−75; accumulated GDP per capita growth for 1870−1913 is given
in 1990 international Geary-Khamis dollars, following Maddison (2001).
The world has been divided between rich and poor according to arbitrary
but explicit criteria: those countries which, in 1870, had a Maddison
GDP per capita below half of that of the richest country in the world
(the United Kingdom) are classified as ‘poor’. In addition, taking into
account what has been said above, a subdivision has been introduced
for the rich, separating land-abundant countries from the rest (according
to the established literature). At the same time, poor countries have
been divided according to their tariff policy independence (in line with
Williamson (2006) and Bairoch (1976, 1989)). As a consequence, this
article analyses 42 countries divided into four geographical regions (see
Appendix, Table A2): 8 rich European countries (DumReg1: Austria,
Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Switzerland and
the United Kingdom); 6 rich new settlers (DumReg2: Argentina, Australia,
8 See Findlay and O’Rourke (2007, p. 401): ‘Countries like Japan gradually increase their
tariff beginning in 1889, but tariffs remained low prior to 1911, when the first autonomous
(and protectionist) tariff was introduced (see Bairoch 1989, p.157).’
9 Other authors, including Bairoch (1989), and, more recently, Williamson (2006b) and
Findlay and O’Rourke (2007), mentioned the importance of free colonial trade policy in
the process of deindustrializing the colonies. But this debate is still open: ‘these trade laws
led first to the disappearance of existing crafts and later curbed the process of
reindustrialization’ (Bairoch 1989, p. 127). Global terms of trade forces produced rising
primary product specialization and de-industrialization in colonial countries at the end of
the nineteenth century (see Lewis 1989 and Williamson 2006b).
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Figure 1. Association between initial tariff average and GDP pc growth,
1870−1913: sample of countries (O’Rourke 2000)
Source: Initial tariff (75NT) and GDP growth (7013GDPGR) in Appendix,
Table A2.
Canada, New Zealand, Uruguay and the USA); 14 poor politically independent
countries from the European periphery and Latin America (DumReg3:
Greece, Hungary, Italy, Norway, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Spain, Sweden,
Serbia, Brazil, Colombia, Cuba and Peru) and 14 poor politically dependent
countries, most of them African and Asian colonies and protectorates
(DumReg4: Burma, Ceylon, China, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Jamaica,
Japan, Morocco, the Philippines, South Africa, Thailand, Tunisia and
Turkey). As Table A2 in the Appendix shows, we do not have a
complete dataset for all countries listed: therefore, for some regressions the
number of observations varies from a minimum of 28 to a maximum of
38.10
To emphasize the regional asymmetry of the tariff−growth association,
we first provide Figures 1 and 2, which confirm the positive association
between the initial tariff average in 1865−75 and real GDP per capita growth
between 1870 and 1913, for the same group of countries used by O’Rourke
(2000) and Jacks (2006) respectively. O’Rourke uses Australia, Canada,
Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Norway, Sweden, the United Kingdom
and the United States, whereas Jacks uses Austria–Hungary, Belgium,
10 Argentina has been included in the group of rich new settlers, despite the fact that its
GDPpc in 1870 was slightly below half UK GDPpc in the same year, according to
Maddison (2003). This is because Argentina is generally considered a rich new settler that
has similar characteristics to an expansionist economy with strong imports of labour and
capital and trade tax dependence. See O’Rourke and Williamson (1999), Irwin (2002b).
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Figure 2. Association between initial tariff average and GDP, 1870−
1913: sample of countries (Jacks 2006)
Source: Initial tariff (75NT) and GDP growth (7013GDPGR) in Appendix,
Table A2.
France, Germany, Italy, Norway, Russia, Spain, the United Kingdom and the
United States. It is important to take into account that most of the countries
included in the sample are rich European and land-abundant countries. The
selection of the country sample is apparently arbitrary and solely determined
by the availability of historical data. In fact, it has been criticized by
several authors (see Irwin (2002a,b), Williamson (2006b) and Tena (2006)).
The strong bias towards rich countries typical of the previous literature is
confirmed by using an alternative sample explicitly containing only rich
countries (new settler and European countries), as shown in Figure 3.
In both cases the regression is strongly influenced by the tariff−growth data
of the USA.
As Figure 4 shows, however, once the whole sample of 38 world countries
is considered, no positive or negative association between tariffs and growth
emerges. A better representation of the world including rich and poor with
colonies and independent developing countries thus provides a different
picture of the tariff−growth relationship. Following Clemens and Williamson
(2001, 2004) and Williamson (2006a), the strategy of this study is to accept
the existence of regional asymmetry, and to propose an organization of world
countries in clubs following the criteria mentioned above. Thus, the poor are
divided according to their political independence, or, in other words, their
capacity to develop an independent commercial policy from the metropolis.
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Figure 3. Association between initial tariff average and GDP pc
growth, 1870−1913: rich countries (European core and rich, land-
abundant countries)
Source: Initial tariff (75NT) and GDP growth (7013GDPGR) in Appendix,
Table A2.
Figure 4. Association between initial tariff average and GDP pc
growth, 1870−1913: worldwide
Source: 75NT and 7013GDPGR in Appendix, Table A2.
This may be an important issue for most Asian and African countries with
the status of colony or protectorate in the late nineteenth century.11
11 There is no doubt that for the late nineteenth century, political autonomy and
independence need to be more accurately defined. For instance, Commonwealth
countries such as Canada, Australia and New Zealand did not have commercial
independene from the metropolis, but they developed an autonomous commercial policy
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Figure 5. Association between initial tariff average and GDP pc growth,
1870−1913: poor countries and dependent trade policies (Asian and African
colonies and protectorates)
Source: Initial tariff (75NT) and GDP growth (7013GDPGR) in Appendix,
Table A2.
Figure 5 shows a stronger positive association between tariffs and growth
for poor non-independent countries. These Asian and African countries
had a low average tariff level (between 3 and 8 per cent) because their
tariff policies enjoyed very limited independence from the core European
metropolis. This exogenous determination of their commercial policy made
it possible to control local pressure groups that wanted higher tariffs and led
to a more neutral incidence of tariffs on the assignment of resources.12
By contrast, Figure 6 shows that for peripheral independent countries the
relationship between tariff average and growth appears consistently negative.
Politically independent poor countries had commercial policies designed
by their own governments and parliaments. The European periphery and
Latin America had high tariffs, especially for traditional industrial products
without comparative advantage, even if some of them were linked with
technologies developed from the First Industrial Revolution. From the
second half of the nineteenth century many poor independent countries
developed some low-skill manufactures, such as traditional textile and metal,
imposing high tariffs especially in non-competitive sectors. Even if they
reduced some manufacture tariffs, during the liberalization period around
for most of the period. Here we follow Clemens and Williamson (2001) and Williamson
(2006a).
12 For a similar approximation for the African and Asian colonies, see Williamson (2006a)
and Bairoch (1989, 1996).
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Figure 6. Association between initial tariff average and GDP pc growth,
1870−1913: poor countries with independent trade policies (European
periphery and Latin America)
Source: Initial tariff (75NT) and GDP growth (7013GDPGR) in Appendix,
Table A2.
the 1850s and 1860s, at the beginning of 1870s they still had a level of
manufacture protection that was more than threefold that of the European
rich countries. During this period they developed well-established and
organized lobbies which demanded high tariffs to defend national industry
from the competition of rich countries’ manufactured exports. When
protectionism became fashionable again in 1880s and 1890s, peripheral
governments were too weak to stop rent-seeking in the economy and most of
them increased manufacture tariffs in non-competitive sectors. These results
could reflect both the existence of poor underlying institutions, and a negative
association between protected industrial sectors and long-run growth.13
3. The causal mechanism between tariffs and growth: tariff
structure and institutions
In order for tariffs to have a positive effect on growth it is necessary
that over time protected manufacturing sectors increase productivity more
rapidly than less protected sectors because productivity growth should
13 The average of the unweighted manufacture tariff for rich European and poor
independent countries in 1875 was 7, 6 and 24, 4, respectively. See Appendix, Table A2.
For an extensive discussion on Latin American protectionism, see Coatsworth and
Williamson (2004) and Be´rtola and Williamson (2006). For the European periphery, see
Federico and Tena (1998, 1999) and Tena (1999, 2006).
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overcome the accumulated protection welfare losses. As Rodriguez and
Rodrik (2000, p. 264) highlight: ‘Such models are in fact formalizations
of some very old arguments about infant industries and about the need
for temporary protection to catch up with more advanced countries.’ In
this case the emphasis is on the dynamics of economies of scale, learning-
by-doing and technical innovation that protected sectors can develop as a
consequence of temporal protection. However, it is questionable to assume
that, without further qualifications, late nineteenth-century manufacturing
as an undifferentiated sector responded to the criteria above. In this sense,
a more reasonable assumption that we can make is that a country which
focuses protection on highly skilled manufacturing industries will probably
have higher rates of growth than if protection were focused on low-skilled
manufacturing sectors.
This opens the question of how decisions about protecting low- or high-
skilled sectors were taken. The literature on endogenous protection has
long recognized that a country’s tariffs are an outcome of a political rent-
seeking game mainly determined by the type of institutions developed in
the country (Krueger 1974, 1997; Magee, Brock and Young 1989; Trefler
1993; Grossman and Helpman 1991, 1994; and Magee 2002). In fact, we
can observe that countries or governments fall prey to ‘rent seekers’ and
usually protect sectors because they are more interested in barring foreign
competitors than promoting growth.
In a very recent paper Nunn and Trefler (2006), following Grossman and
Helpman’s (1994) protection-for-sale model, develop a new approach to
examine the causal mechanism between tariffs and long-term growth for the
late twentieth century, introducing externalities into the model.14 In the new
model, tariffs affect future growth via externalities and these externalities
vary across industries. High tariffs reduce welfare, and probably growth,
if they are not distributed in favour of industries which generate positive
externalities at an economy-wide level. Nunn and Trefler’s contribution
links to the previous literature on the institutions-protection dynamic, by
suggesting that only countries with developed institutions, able to put
a lid on lobbying, will favour tariffs in skill-intensive industries against
non-skill-intensive industries. So, this model assumes that good institutions
encourage politicians to be closer to pro-growth policies.15
Following Nunn and Trefler, this article adopts the hypothesis that a
country with ‘good’ institutions will provide higher tariffs in industries that
generate positive externalities. These externalities would have to operate at
14 For the positive externalities of some sectors on general productivity, see Antweiler and
Trefler (2002), Irwin (1994).
15 There are many Olsonian ‘collective action’ arguments and national case studies to
support this argument; see Irwin and Klenow (1994), Magee, Brock and Young (1989),
Federico and Tena (1999) and Tena (2005).
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an economy-wide level, coming from general economic and/or technological
sources, rather than from manufacturing alone.
Following the tradition of the tariff−growth literature, and especially
Nunn and Trefler (2006), equation (1) expresses the dependent relationship
between the annual average rate of growth of GDP per capita and, as
explanatory variables, tariff average, manufacture tariffs, tariff structure and
the quality of institutions:
ln YC1/YC0 = β0YC0 + βEEτ c0 + βSBSBv τc0 + Xc0 βX + RegDum + εc (1)
In this equation we consider only long-term growth, so we take t = 0 to be
the initial year (1870) and t = 1, the final year (1913).
The dependent variable is lnYC1 /YC0 (measured as the accumulated real
GDP per capita growth rate). β0YC0 refers to the initial GDP per capita in
1870 used as the classical variable of control for convergence in this type of
exercise. Eτ c0 is the tariff total or manufacture average (we will use both)
in country c and initial year 0 (1875). Let SBv τ c0 be the tariff structure
showed by the skill-bias of tariffs in country c in initial year 0 (1875), and
Xc0 βX as country-specific variables related to the quality of institutions. We
also introduce regional dummies as regional fixed effect related to the level
of development, land abundance or political independence, with only two
values 0 and 1.
In the case of the initial tariff average (Eτ c0) we will use the weighted total
tariff average ‘75NT’ and the unweighted tariff average for manufacture
‘75UNTMAN’, as presented in Table A2 in the Appendix. For the initial
tariff structure (SBv τ c0) we will use the initial manufacture skill bias
constructed following Nunn and Trefler’s (2006) procedures. The first
proxy used is presented as ‘75Corr-Skill’, and defined as the cross-industry
correlation between skill-intensity ranking estimated for 1875, shown in
Table 1, and the respective ranking of ad valorem tariffs of the same sectors.
Most of the countries in our sample have a negative correlation sign between
the skill and tariff ranking, showing in general that tariffs are usually higher
in non-skill-intensive industries and lower in skill-intensive industries (see
correlation in Table A3 in the Appendix). The second proxy used is ‘75Diff-
Skill’, which is constructed choosing an arbitrary ‘cut-off’ in the ranking of
skill-intensive industries and calculated as the simple difference between
the unweighted tariff average of the sectors situated in the ‘up cut-off’ and
those of the ‘down cut-off’ for every country. This cut-off has been chosen in
relation to the largest differences in the skill-intensity sectors around the mid
point of the ranking (see Table 1 below). For the institutional variables, two
types of index have been used: one that relates to the level of democracy of
a country, POLITY2 (numeric), range = –10 to 10 (–10= high autocracy;
10= high democracy); and another which measures the grade of
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Table 1. Skill-intensity ranking
Ranking Description Skill intensity
1 Ships 13,01
2 Machinery hardware etc. 12,65
3 Paper manufactures 11,65
4 Silk thrown 11,58
5 Iron steel manufactures 11,29
6 Leather and manufactures 11,00 high cut-off
7 Copper lingots, cakes, slabs 10,01
8 Alkali chemical products 9,64
9 Apparel 9,27
10 Woollen & worsted manufactures 7,9 low cut off
11 Linen manufactures 7,8
12 Cotton manufactures 7,74
13 Jute canvas and sacking 7,04
14 Woollen yarns(stuffs all wool) 6,2
15 Linen yarn 5,9
16 Cotton yarns undyed 5,8
Sources: The wages used to construct this ‘skill-intensity’ ranking came from two different
sources: the wage distribution for male production workers in 12 manufacturing industrial
sectors in 1890 in Iowa (covering the 165 largest cities) offered by Claudia Goldin and Frank
Katz (1999, appendix table 1, p. 46) and the patchy but abundant information on wage
distribution in the textile sector (cotton, wool, hemp, jute and silk) in Barcelona in 1884
(included in Scheuch 1885).
independence of the executive government, XCONST (numeric). The
last institutional variable would be used as proxy variable of good
institutions in relation to the independence of the government from pressure
groups.
4. New data on industrial tariffs, skill-bias and institutions
With the exception of Bairoch (1989), there are no comparative studies of
industrial tariff levels of the 1870s by country. Bairoch (1989) includes a table
of comparative industrial tariff averages in 1875 for 14 countries (‘Author’s
computation based on tariff duties and prices for 14 different manufactured
products’, p. 42). But he does not offer information on the manufactured
items included, or the method used (tariffs, prices and weights). A more
accurate attempt at estimating manufacture tariffs by country was developed
very recently in Lehman and O’Rourke (2008). This work offers a time-series
estimation for the years 1875–1913 of weighted agricultural, manufacturing
and ‘exotics’ tariffs for the same sample of 10 countries used in O’Rourke
(2000). The procedure adopted was to divide customs revenues by total
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imports in 16 identical commodity categories for every country and classified
as belonging to either.16
The estimation presented here has been devised adopting the following
procedure (for details of the estimation of the industrial tariff database
see Appendix). In the first place, British sources offered the ad valorem
tariffs of 26 industrial products in 1875 for 32 countries; secondly, those
26 industrial products have been assembled in 16 industrial sectors for
which their relative skill intensity has been estimated, based on the general
structure of USA industrial wages in 1890 (using secondary sources) and
other sources of textile wages in 1885 in Spain (from the USA Consular
Reports).
The ad valorem tariff sources used in this estimation were taken, firstly,
from the study directed by Robert Giffen and presented to the House of
Commons in 1877 and 1881. The data were developed by the UK Statistical
and Commercial Department Board of Trade, with the title: ‘Import duties
on British goods (foreign countries) and rates of duty (foreign and colonial)
on British manufactures or produce’. Secondly, data came from the Annual
Statement of Trade (1876) and Board of Trade (1878). The first work relates
tariffs and prices imposed upon 15−24manufactured articles in 32 countries;
the second relates prices and duties for an additional 9 manufactured articles
obtained from a similar group of countries. This material provides us with
a complete series of homogeneous data of the tariff average for around 26
industrial products in 32 countries (for sources, products and technique used
see Appendix).
A detailed study has been developed also for the classification of the
mentioned manufacture tariffs in a ranking according to their respective
skill intensity. In the literature, relative skill intensity by sector is estimated
by using ratios of workers with more than 12 years of schooling over the
total. To our knowledge, no data of this kind is available on the ratios of
skilled workers in different industrial sectors at the end of the nineteenth
century.17 Skill-intensity measures are apparently quite resistant to temporal
and geographical change; we have made the assumption that capital is
uniformly distributed between sectors, and in consequence that sectors with
16 The authors do not make explicit how many of these identical 16 categories are
manufactures. Apparently they get a weighted manufacture tariff average by dividing
customs revenues by imports for the total category for every country. The estimation of
the unweighted tariff average is not possible under this procedure. As elasticity of import
demand for manufactures used to be quite high, weighted tariff averages undervalued the
manufacture tariff average of countries and years with higher tariffs.
17 The oldest compelling available source is the UK census of 1951, which offers figures for
skilled, semi-skilled and unskilled blue-collar (male and female) and the number of
white-collar workers by sectors. See the recent paper by Beltran, Ferry and Pons (2007),
which includes an estimation of skill intensity based on this data.
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relatively higher salaries have a higher proportion of skilled workers.18 This
means that we assume that higher ‘median’ wage sectors will rank higher in
our estimations of skill intensity.19
The wages used to construct the skill-intensity ranking shown in Table 1
came from two different sources (as noted at the foot of the table). In the
first case, the complete wage structure makes it possible to estimate the
‘median’ wage of the sector. In the second case, extensive but incomplete
information on wages for different textile sectors allows us to construct
incomplete professional samples by sector, but it suggests the use of a simple
wage average instead of the ‘median’ average for the estimation skill-intensity
ranking of the different textiles sectors.
For the institutional variables, the level of democracy of a country,
POLITY2 and the level of independence of the executive government,
XCONST, the data came from the Polity IV database. It contains
coded annual information on regime and authority characteristics for all
independent states (with a total population greater than 500,000) in the
global state system and covers the years 1800–2004.20
5. Evidence on tariffs and growth
The recent paper by Lehmann and O’Rourke (2008) mentioned above uses
panel data exploiting the variation in agricultural and industrial tariffs for a
sample of 10 countries, most of them rich, in the late nineteenth century.
Attention is focused on the association of manufacture and agricultural tariff
structure with the ups and downs of economic activity of the rich countries.21
The work developed here places greater emphasis on the manufacture tariff
structure and long-run growth of rich and poor countries according to the
skill-intensity structure of their manufacturing sector. Therefore we designed
an extended and homogeneous ad valorem tariff database for around
26 industrial products for 32 countries in 1875, and later we assembled
these data in 16 industrial sectors, ranked according to their relative skill-
intensity bias. This model, for the first time, privileges the industrial tariff
structure, the geographical coverage of data, and the long-run relationship
18 This may produce errors in some circumstances because the temporal scarcity of some
skills may offer high salaries independently of productivity. For this reason we prefer our
broader measure of skill intensity represented by 75 Diff-Skill.
19 Nunn and Trefler (2006) show how the use of alternative skill-intensity rankings at the
same time as those of the USA (1972), South Africa (1997) and Brazil (1972) had no effect
at all on the final results of their correlation coefficient between skill intensity and growth.
20 See description of variables in POLITY IV Project.
21 This is clearly noted in Lehmann and O’Rourke’s (2008) conclusion: ‘By focusing on
five-year periods, in common with much of the empirical literature, we may have been
picking up the short to medium run impact of protection, rather than the longer run
effects’ (p. 14).
15
between tariffs and growth. In order to capture this effect, regional
dummy fixed variables or different clubs of countries will be employed
alternatively. The econometric strategy of this article is to run a simple
cross-section model with interaction terms and fixed regional effects in order
to capture the income and regional influence in the association between
tariffs and long-run growth.22 Furthermore, an intuitive theoretical model
of endogenous growth is provided which relates both sides of the equation.
We expect that, in general terms, most of the countries of our sample
will impose high tariffs in industries that generate no positive externalities
and slow growth. In a cross-section study like this, the reduced number of
observations allows the simultaneous introduction of several control variables
and explanatory variables all together in a single regression equation.
Average tariff (75NT), manufacture tariffs (75UNTMAN) and structure
of protection (75Diff Skill) may not be put in one regression because
there is a high correlation between them. Only the initial GDP per capita
(70GDPpc) and the variables that proxy good institutions (75XCONST)
would be used, in the same regression, with the regional dummies, as control
variables.23
Table 2 tests the comparative explanatory power of the total tariff average,
manufacture tariff and skill industrial tariff respectively for long-run growth
in 1870–1913.24 Variables are not logged and the respective regressions
include three additional dummy variables with regional fixed effects related
to the level of development, land abundance or political independence (with
only two values 0 and 1, rich countries = 1, the rest = 0; rich land-abundant
countries = 1, the rest = 0; politically independent countries = 1, the rest =
0) following the discussion in previous sections regarding the importance
of the level of development, factor endowment and political independence
variables in the explanation of regional asymmetry found between tariffs and
growth by the literature. Regression 1 shows that these regional fixed effects
are relevant in the regressions between the tariff average and late nineteenth-
century growth. The regional fixed-effect dummies allow extending the
explanatory power of the initial average tariff on growth from the small
group of rich countries, as defined by O’Rourke, to a more representative
world of 38 countries. Furthermore, the results would show that in a larger
22 Cross-sectional regression with initial measures of export of natural resources, openness,
tariffs explaining long-run growth are common in this literature. See well-known empirical
growth studies, such as Sachs and Warner (1999), Edwards (1992, 1998) or Irwin
(2002b).
23 The explanation why we have not shown one regression containing all variables is related
to the high bivariate correlation coefficients between most variables shown in Table A3 of
the Appendix. An exception to this high correlation is the low coefficient shown between
75xConst and 75Diff-Skill.
24 The basic variables and sources of Table 2 are defined and commented on in Appendix
Table A2 and Section 4.
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Table 2. Tariff structure and economic growth with regional fixed effects
Dependent variable: growth in real per capita GDP, 1870 to 1913
1 2 3 4 5
Initial per capita GDP −0.0004 −0.005 −0.005 −0.006 −0.005
(70 GDPpc) 0.005∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗
Initial total tariff average −0.023
(75 NT) 0.005∗∗∗
Initial manufacture tariff −1.526
average unweighted
(75 UNTMAN)
0.013∗∗
Initial tariff skill bias 2.033 2.039
(75 Diff Skill) 0.002∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗
Goods institutions 0.046 0.099
(75XCONS) 0.225 0.013∗∗
Dummy abundant land 0.663 0.621 0.574 0.575 0.356
(DumLand) 0.008∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗ 0.119
Dummy rich 0.542 0.727 0.684 0.723 0.674
(DumRich) 0.039∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗
Dummy political
independence
0.793 0.848 0.954 0.83 0.479
0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗ 0.051∗
Number of observations 38 33 32 28 32
R2 0.558 0.626 0.671 0.675 0.503
R2(Adjusted) 0.489 0.556 0.608 0.582 0.407
Note: P-values underlined.
∗∗∗significant at 1%; ∗∗significant at 5%; ∗significant at 10%.
Sources: Appendix, Table A2.
world, with rich and poor countries included in the sample, the sign of
this relationship changes from positive to negative. What is more important,
as regression 2 shows, the countries which imposed higher tariffs on the
manufacturing sector were those that had the worst growth performance,
and this relationship is stronger than shown by the total tariff average.
Exploring further the association between manufacture tariffs and growth,
regression 3 offers some evidence to support the idea that there is a positive
relationship between the efficiency of the structure of manufacture protection
and growth. The efficiency of the structure of protection in this work means
higher tariffs in the more skill-intensive manufacturing sectors, and it is
measured by the initial tariff skill bias (our variable 75Diff Skill). The
coefficient of correlation between manufacture tariffs (75UNTMAN) and
tariff skill bias (75Diff Skill) is very high and negative (−0.91), which does not
allow us to include both variables in the same regression, but would support
the idea that those with higher manufacture tariffs were those with the most
inefficient structure of manufacture protection. That would suggest too that
countries which apparently put more emphasis on an import-substituting
strategy, and imposed higher tariffs on manufacturing sectors, were those
that had a more inefficient manufacture tariff structure and a worse growth
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performance. This evidence would fit with the initial hypothesis that more
protected countries were more interested in barring foreign competitors than
in promoting growth, which is consistent with the suggestion that tariffs may
be the outcome of a political rent-seeking game in which the quality of
institutions may play an important role as a causal variable. Nevertheless,
we should decide between good tariff structure and good institutions, as
the main factor responsible for good growth performance, because of the
potential endogenous connection between both variables. Our concern is
to find a direct connection between a good manufacture tariff structure
and its potential positive externalities in the wide economy as the main
explanatory variable for growth. Regression 5 in Table 2 shows, on one hand,
that the coefficient of ‘good institutions’, explained by a variable as the level
of independence of the executive government (75XCONST), is very low but
positive and significant. On the other hand, regression 4 offers a combination
of both variables, good institutions and good tariff structure, in the same
regression. The result shows that tariff structure and not institutions is the
main variable explaining late nineteenth-century growth, which is consistent
with the argument outlined above.25
Tables 3 to 6 present a test of the regional asymmetry of the different
explanatory variables used above (total tariffs, manufacture unweighted
tariffs, skill-bias tariff and good institutions). The econometric strategy
Table 3. Initial total tariffs and growth regressions with interaction terms
Dependent variable: 1870–1913 GDP per capita growth
Eq. 1 Eq. 2
Variables Coeff. Prob. Coeff. Prob.
Constant 1.121 0.000 1.557 0.000∗∗∗
Initial per capita GDP (70GDPpc) 0.000 0.948 0.000 0.265
75NT∗Dummy R1 − − 0.023 0.017∗∗
75NT∗Dummy R2 − − 0.021 0.005∗∗∗
75NT∗Dummy R3 − − −0.024 0.042∗∗
75NT∗Dummy R4 − − −0.100 0.020∗∗
75NT∗Dummy rich (R1+R2) 0.024 0,035∗∗ − −
75NT∗Dummy poor (R3+R4) −0.015 0,081∗ − −
Number of observations 37 37
Prob > F 0.00∗∗∗ 0.00∗∗∗
R-squared 0.42 0.44
Adj R-squared 0.32 0.33
Sources: Appendix, Table A2.
25 That would be possible because the coefficient of correlation between the skill bias (75diff
Skill) and our measures of good institutions (75XCONST) and (75POLT2) are very low,
around 0,20 and 0, 08 respectively.
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Table 4. Initial manufacture unweighted tariffs and growth regressions
with interaction terms
Dependent variable: 1870–1913 GDP per capita growth
Eq. 1 Eq. 2
Variables Coeff. Prob. Coeff. Prob.
Constant 1.182 0.000 1.824 0.000
Initial per capita GDP
(70GDPpc)
0.000 0.980 0.000 0.077∗
75UNTMAN∗Dummy R1 − − 0.008 0.001∗∗∗
75UNTMAN∗Dummy R2 − − 0.018 0.000∗∗∗
75UNTMAN∗Dummy R3 − − −0.022 0.004∗∗∗
75UNTMAN∗Dummy R4 − − −0.107 0.002∗∗∗
75UNTMAN∗Dummy rich
(R1+R2)
0.022 0,0698∗ − −
75UNTMAN∗Dummy poor
(R3+R4)
−0.012 0,018∗∗ − −
Number of observations 33 33
Prob>F 0.00∗∗∗ 0.00∗∗∗
R-squared 0.38 0.53
Adj R-squared 0.31 0.44
Table 5. Initial skill-bias tariffs and growth regressions with interaction
terms
Dependent variable: 1870–1913 GDP per capita growth
Eq. 1 Eq. 2
Variables Coeff. Prob. Coeff. Prob.
Constant 1.039 0.000 1.151 0.000∗∗∗
Initial per capita GDP
(70GDPpc)
0.000 0.392 0.000 0.645
75DIFF_SKILL∗Dummy R1 − − −2.821 0.529
75DIFF_SKILL∗Dummy R2 − − −3.172 0.046∗∗
75DIFF_SKILL∗Dummy R3 − − 1.556 0.035∗∗
75DIFF_SKILL∗Dummy R4 − − −16.408 0.188
75DIFF_SKILL∗Dummy rich
(R1+R2)
−3.259 0,039∗∗ − −
75DIFF_SKILL∗Dummy
poor (R3+R4)
1.291 0,066∗ − −
Number of observations 32 32
Prob>F 0.00∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗
R-squared 0.35 0.40
Adj R-squared 0.28 0.28
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Table 6. Initial skill-bias tariffs and growth regressions with interaction
terms
Dependent variable: 1870–1913 GDP per capita growth
Eq. 1 Eq. 2
Variables Coeff. Prob. Coeff. Prob.
Constant 1.597 0.000 1.611 0.000
Initial per capita GDP
(70GDPpc)
0.000 0.314 0.000 0.332
75DIFF_SKILL∗Dummy R1 − − −2.213 0.603
75DIFF_SKILL∗Dummy R2 − − −2.731 0.073∗
75DIFF_SKILL∗Dummy R3 − − 2.269 0.003∗∗∗
75DIFF_SKILL∗Dummy R4 − − −9.223 0.587
75DIFF_SKILL∗Dummy rich
(R1+R2)
−2.710 0,063∗
75DIFF_SKILL∗Dummy poor
(R3+R4)
2.239 0,003∗∗∗ − −
75POLT2 0.013 0.421 0.014 0.409
Number of observations 28 28
Prob>F 0.00∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗
R-squared 0.48 0.49
Adj R-squared 0.38 0.34
Sources: Appendix, Table A2.
used in these tables was to introduce four different regional dummies, with
interaction terms, for each of the respective independent variables. On
one hand, in equation 2 we introduce our four different regional dummy
variables: Dummy R1: rich European countries; Dummy R2: rich new
settlers; Dummy R3: poor politically independent countries; and Dummy
R4: colonies and protectorates. On the other hand, in equation 1 we offer a
regional division of the world between the ‘rich club’ (Dummy rich (R1+R2))
and the ‘poor club’ (Dummy poor (R3+R4). As expected, following the main
hypothesis of the article, results show how the relationship between tariffs
and growth is only slightly positive and significant for the ‘rich countries club’
and negative and strongly significant for the rest. This happened for total
and for manufacture tariffs (NT and UNTMAN respectively) and in both
equations. In equation 1, we present the world divided into two separate
clubs according to the level of development (Dummy rich (R1+R2) and
Dummy poor (R3+R4)), and in equation 2 the impact of every regional
dummy. Results show a positive sign for the rich Europeans and land-
abundant countries (Dummy R1 and Dummy R2) and a negative sign for
the poor independent (Dummy R3) and for the poor dependent countries
(Dummy R4) respectively. Therefore, in line with previous findings, Tables 3
and 4 show that the influence of tariff average and tariff manufacture on
growth at the end of the nineteenth century was negative for the world
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globally, as Table 2 shows, but that the impact was different for rich and
poor countries. It would confirm that Bairoch and O’Rourke’s tariff−growth
positive hypothesis apparently only works in the case of the ‘rich countries
club’.
Despite a general positive correlation between the protection of skill-
intensive sectors and growth applying to the entire sample, still regional
asymmetry persists, as shown in Tables 5 and 6. Results in Table 2 fit
with the general expectations that countries that protected the more skilled
industrial sectors were those with the best growth performance. However,
regional correlations introduced in equation 1 of Tables 5 and 6 show that
this mainly happened in the ‘poor countries club’. On the contrary, rich
countries appear to have a negative relationship between the efficiency of
the structure of protection and growth performance, even if coefficients
are significant only if the interval of confidence is reduced to 5 or even 10
per cent. This appears to be as a paradox, as it means that, in the case of
the rich countries, those that protected the unskilled manufacturing sectors
more ended-up with better growth performance. However, at a deeper
level of disaggregation, a negative correlation is only significant for the new
settler land-abundant countries (Dummy R2), but not for the rich European
countries (Dummy R1). To explain this result one can consider that new
settler economies may be outliers because their special factor endowment
created the conditions to impose high tariffs for reasons involving public
finance and political economy, as discussed in the introduction. For these
countries growth was exogenous to protection in general, while the structure
of protection was oriented towards low-skilled sectors because their relative
lower elasticity of demand led to maximization of tax revenues.
5. Conclusions
The potential dynamic relationship between tariffs and growth can be better
appreciated in the long run, and this article highlights the importance
of the structure of protection and regional asymmetry in this long-
term relationship. In theory, there is no reason to find a systematically
unambiguous association between average tariffs and growth in different
groups of countries, and regional asymmetry may be partially explained by
different tariff structures.
The article’s main methodological innovation is the use of a new
database of industrial tariffs for 32 countries in the 1870s. This new
evidence allows us, for the first time, to include manufacture protection
and manufacture tariff structure as explanatory variables alongside tariff
average, and different regional dummies. Results show that, at a global
level, income, factor endowment, and political independence are important
variables to explain regional asymmetry in the association between tariffs
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and growth. Under these conditions, an increase in protection, measured by
total and manufacture tariff averages, implied more protection of unskilled
and inefficient sectors and less growth, and this is especially consistent with
the behaviour of poor countries in the late nineteenth century. Protection
was apparently positive for the ‘rich countries club’, but had a limited impact
on growth.
Comparative advantage in low-skilled sectors might be an engine for
growth, therefore higher protection of those sectors might appear as
a legitimate option. However, international trade theory and historical
experience show that tariffs never focus on relatively low-cost sectors
with comparative advantage in the present day. Tariffs in non-comparative
advantage sectors in the present day may have a positive relationship with
growth in the future, if high tariffs are imposed in sectors with dynamic
positive externalities. Endogenous growth literature assumes that this might
be the case if ‘good institutions’ succeed in controlling rent-seeking.
In this article tariff skill-bias runs through measures of good institutions,
and reduces the possibility that the skill-bias of the protection structure is
capturing the broader effect of ‘good institutions’ on growth. In broader
terms, this article proves that the initial total and manufacture tariff negative
relation with growth is related to the tariff structure, and shows how those
that protected skill-intensive sectors had a better growth performance than
those who did not, and this is specially true for the poor countries. Tariff
structure provides a better causal mechanism for explaining the 1870–1913
growth than the initial tariff average, independently of income level. The
article also proves the strong regional asymmetric effect of tariffs on growth
in the world between the rich and the poor.
This works thus rejects the established view that, as a general statement,
tariffs were positively associated with long-run growth in late nineteenth
century, as has been maintained recently by O’Rourke (2000), Williamson
(2001, 2006a), Jacks (2006). European and Latin American peripheral
countries demanded high tariffs to defend national industry from the
competition of manufactured imports from rich countries. Tariff structure
was the result of a rent-seeking policy competition between inefficient sectors
trying to defend national manufactures more than a governmental tariff
import-substitution strategy. An inefficient manufacture tariff structure did
not foster positive externalities at an economy-wide level, and this was
especially true for the developing world. That is probably the reason why
total, and especially manufacture tariffs, usually appear associated with
negative growth in the world in the late nineteenth century.
Protection, in general, seems negatively correlated with growth, but
apparently had a slightly positive impact on the ‘rich country club’. This
result, in the strict sense, is consistent with Lehman and O’Rourke (2008),
highlighting the fact that manufacture tariffs were positively related to growth
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in the developed world in the late nineteenth century: ‘it could well be
that what was true in our sample of more or less affluent economies was
not true for poorer regions of the world as well’ (p. 13). Strong regional
asymmetries suggest that the association between protection and growth
depends on what was protected. This article suggests that in the late
nineteenth century, as today, it is necessary not only to look at the different
impacts of agricultural vs industrial protection, but at the efficiency in the
configuration of manufacture protection too. Much work is still to be done
regarding the reasons for the different configurations of tariff structures,
but also regarding the different impact of tariff policy in different economic
contexts, to understand more about the dynamic mechanism of causality
between tariffs and long-run growth.
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Appendix: Estimation of the industrial tariff
database in 1875
There is some well-known contemporaneous estimation of comparative
manufacture tariff averages by country before World War I. The League
of Nations (1927) offers comparative index numbers for more than a
dozen countries in 1913, but only Liepman (1938) develops a complete
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disaggregated study by sector with an explicit methodology for the same
year. Another relevant study, less commonly used by economic historians, is
that of the Board of Trade (1905), which offers estimations of tariff averages
in 20 countries for 32 manufactured articles.
For 1870s, there is not a single systematic study, so to develop the necessary
quantitative variables on cross-country industrial sector tariffs, a new panel
of data has been constructed on the ad valorem tariffs of 26 industrial
articles in 1875 for 32 countries based on British sources. Following League
of Nations and Liepman recommendations, we offer both the unweighted
and the weighted tariff average. For the first, a simple arithmetic average
of the 26 industrial articles has been estimated for every country, for the
second, the relative importance of every article in total British exports is
used as weight (see column 3 of Table A1 in this Appendix). This technique
involves, in the first place, making a list of the principal classes of goods
and assigning a rough ‘weight’ to each group according to its comparative
importance in British exports. A few leading articles or classes of articles are
then chosen from each group as representative of the whole group, and the
average tariff rates of duty on these leading articles for each country are taken
as fairly representative of the tariff treatment of the whole group. These tariffs
should be expressed using the standard British monetary, capacity, mass or
weight units for the corresponding articles (for special calculations see the
technical specifications below points (a), (b) and (c) in Table A1).
The sources present the incidence of import tariffs on the principal
manufactures exported from United Kingdom (the main world manufacture
exporter in 1875) in more than 32 countries. This estimation uses British fob
export prices instead of national cif import prices in the denominator for the
estimation of the ad valorem tariffs. On the one hand, this would imply an
over-bias, but in the case of manufactured articles with low freight factors,
practical implementation of fob instead of cif prices makes little difference to
the final results.26 On the other hand, especially for poor countries, British
export values are in fact closer to real market prices than the low accurate
import unit values that most of the poor countries had in their respective
official trade statistics in 1870.27
To obtain the sector tariff average, the unweighted tariff of the articles
belonging to the sector was used. In this way, a complete series of homoge-
neous data of the tariff average for 14–16 industrial sectors in 32 countries
26 The League of Nations (1927) used cif import and fob export prices for the estimation of
total tariff average and concluded that ‘the results obtained under the two systems are in
fair accordance, but those from method B (fob export prices) tend to be slightly higher
(on the average circa 8 per cent)’, p. 6. In the case of the estimation of manufactures fob
the accordance between the two systems is probably very close because manufacture
freight factors are much lower than for primary products.
27 For the accuracy of international foreign trade values see Federico and Tena (1991) and
Tena (1992).
27
was obtained (for the sectors see Table 1; for the countries see Table A2).
This method (which is adopted below) has the advantage of applying a
uniform standard to all countries, both as regards the list of articles on
which the duties are calculated, and the relative ‘weight’ attached to each
article. The unweighted manufacture tariff by country assumes an artificial
standard import demand structure for every country which has not been
biased by tariffs.28
Sources
Ad valorem rates, import duties and prices of manufactures exported in 1875
The data on prices were presented with the respective tariffs by the UK
Statistical and Commercial Department Board of Trade, with the title
‘Import duties on British goods (foreign countries) and rates of duty (foreign
and colonial) on British manufactures or produce’, and also on import
duties in ‘British goods (foreign countries) return of the estimated average
ad valorem rate of import duty levied in the principal European countries and
in the United States, on certain articles of British produce or manufacture’,
both in British Parliamentary Papers vol. LXXVI.181, session 1877. This study
has been complemented by other estimations on prices, especially for textiles
(for instance, cotton manufactures and woollen and worsted manufactures)
but also for an additional nine manufactured articles for the year 1875, from
the ‘Annual statement of trade: return of the values of the exports of British
and Irish produce 1854–1880’. British Parliamentary Papers vol. LXV, session
1882.
With this material a complete series of additional homogeneous data of the
tariff average for 16–14 industrial sectors in 32 countries has been obtained
(for the final sector aggregation see Table A1). This study was directed by
Robert Giffen and presented to the House of Commons in 1877 and 1881.
Technical specification for some articles used for 1875:
(a) In the same way as for cotton piece goods, for cotton yarns 40 yards
to the lb has been assumed. See British Parliamentary Papers (1905),
p. 291.
(b) Cotton piece goods are entered in UK Trade Accounts by the yard,
whereas most duties are imposed by weight or graduated according
to the weight per square metre of the tissues. An ‘average account’ of
28 The unweighted average was recommended by Loveday in his work on ‘tariff levels’ for
the League of Nations (1927) and was also supported by Liepman (1938). The League of
Nations (1927) estimated a tariff manufacture unweighted average using 110
manufactured articles (excluding semi-manufactures). Liepman (1938) used the
unweighted average of tariffs on fob export prices for 144 products, in which he used a
separate index for semi-manufactures (44 articles) and manufactures (62 manufactured
articles).
28
5 yards to the lb has been assumed. See British Parliamentary Papers
(1905), p. 291.
(c) In the case of woollen and worsted piece goods, average weights have
been estimated varying from 18 oz to the yard for heavy broad woollen
piece goods and worsted coatings to 5 oz to the yard for mixed worsted
stuffs. See British Parliamentary Papers (1905) p. 291.
(d) Equivalence for measurement of mass or weight: 1 ton = 20 cwt; 1 cwt =
112 lb = 50.8 kg; 100 yard = 20 lb; 1 oz = 1/16 lb; 1 lb = 0.453 kg.
(e) Official equivalence for monetary units: 1 pound = 20 shillings = 240d;
1 shilling = 12d.
Database available to researchers upon request.
Table A1. Groups, articles and prices taken as representative of British
manufacture exports, 1875
Group Representative articles
Value of British
exports 1875
(thousand
pounds)
Average export
value of these
articles 1875
Cotton yarns (a) 12782
1. Cotton single
unbleached
9d/lb
2. Cotton single
undyed
20d/lb
3. Cotton double
undyed
23d/lb
Cotton manufactures
(b)
4. Cotton piece
bleached
31454 1988d/cwt (d)
5. Cotton piece
printed
18494 2661d/cwt (d)
Woollen & worsted
yarn
6. Woollen and
worsted yarn
undyed
4417 60d/lb
Woollen & worsted
manufacture(c)
7. Woollen stuffs all
wool
18603 4594d/cwt (d)
Linen yarn (lbs) 1450
8. Linen yarns
unbleached
20d/lb
9. Linen yarns single 26d/lb
10. Linen yarns double 46d/lb
Silk (thrown) 11. Silk thrown 1081 800d/lb
Jute manufactures 12. Jute canvas and
sacking
1212 4d/lb
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Table A1. Continued
Group Representative articles
Value of British
exports 1875
(thousand
pounds)
Average export
values of these
articles 1875
Iron and steel
manufactures
13. Pig iron 2842 1200d/ton
14. Bars & angle 17382 1680d/ton
15. Rails including steel
rails
10225 1680d/ton
Machinery hardware
& c
16. Textile machinery 1383 588d/cwt
17. Locomotive
machinery
556 540d/cwt
18. Sewing machinery 518 1620d/cwt
Copper manufactures 19. Copper lingots,
cakes, slabs
983 19200d/ton
Leather and related
manufactures
2945
20. Ox & cow hides 26d/lb
21. Calf skins 46d/lb
Alkali chemical
products
2223
22. Bicarbonate of soda 228d/cwt
23. Caustic soda 280d/cwt
24. Soda crystals 82d/cwt
Paper manufactures 1020
25. Paper for writing 6d/lb
26. Paper for printing 4d/lb
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Table A2. Variables and data used in the tariff–growth regressions
7013 75Dif 75Corr Dum Dum Dum Dum
COUNTRY 75NT 70GDPpc GDPGR 75NTMAN 75UNTMAN Skill Skill 75POLT2 75XCONS 75INST Land Rich Ind Reg
AU 4.3 1862.6 1.45 21.6 14.1 −0.03 −0.08 −4.00 3.00 −0.50 0 1 1 1
BEL 1.5 2691.5 1.05 8.2 5.8 −0.04 −0.36 6.00 7.00 6.50 0 1 1 1
DEN 12.3 2003.2 1.57 14.9 9.9 −0.05 −0.14 −3.00 3.00 0.00 0 1 1 1
FRA 3.8 1875.7 1.45 21.3 15.1 −0.07 −0.23 7.00 7.00 7.00 0 1 1 1
GER 3.7 1839.1 1.61 13.1 8.7 −0.07 −0.25 −4.00 3.00 −0.50 0 1 1 1
NET 6.0 2756.8 0.90 2.0 1.3 −0.01 −0.10 −3.00 6.00 1.50 0 1 1 1
SWI 3.6 2102.1 1.66 3.1 4.5 0.00 0.10 10.00 7.00 8.50 0 1 1 1
UK 6.7 3190.4 1.01 1.0 1.0 3.00 7.00 5.00 0 1 1 1
AR 22.8 1310.6 2.50 17.3 18.5 −0.13 −0.40 −3.00 3.00 0.00 1 1 1 2
AUS 9.7 3273.2 1.06 6.5 6.0 0.03 0.24 10.00 7.00 8.50 1 1 1 2
CAN 12.8 1694.5 2.27 9.8 11.7 −0.03 −0.17 4.00 7.00 5.50 1 1 1 2
NEW 11.7 3099.7 1.19 5.7 6.7 −0.05 −0.68 10.00 7.00 8.50 1 1 1 2
USA 38.5 2444.6 1.82 61.1 52.0 −0.30 −0.60 10.00 7.00 8.50 1 1 1 2
URU 22.8 2180.8 0.98 0.0 0.0 −3.00 1.00 −1.00 1 1 1 2
GRE 14.0 880.0 1.39 10.8 12.6 −0.09 −0.51 9.00 7.00 8.00 0 0 1 3
HUN 4.3 1091.6 1.53 21.6 14.1 −0.03 −0.08 −4.00 3.00 −0.50 0 0 1 3
ITA 7.9 1499.4 1.26 15.4 10.2 −0.02 −0.14 −4.00 3.00 −0.50 0 0 1 3
NOR 11.6 1432.3 1.30 11.0 5.4 −0.08 −0.33 −4.00 5.00 0.50 0 0 1 3
POR 28.6 975.0 0.58 30.5 36.4 −0.33 −0.53 −7.00 3.00 −2.00 0 0 1 3
ROM 7.9 931.0 1.47 4.5 7.0 0.04 0.34 −7.00 3.00 −2.00 0 0 1 3
RUS 12.9 943.3 1.06 63.0 40.1 −0.18 −0.19 −10.00 1.00 −4.50 0 0 1 3
SPA 15.0 1207.1 1.25 50.2 34.5 −0.19 −0.46 −1.00 7.00 3.00 0 0 1 3
SWE 10.6 1661.5 1.46 14.9 9.1 −0.07 −0.30 −4.00 5.00 0.50 0 0 1 3
SER 2.8 599.0 1.33 0.0 0.0 0 0 1 3
BRA 34.6 713.0 0.30 36.7 33.6 −0.26 −0.70 −6.00 1.00 −2.50 0 0 1 3
COL 28.3 749.0 1.17 29.1 40.8 −0.38 −0.69 −3.00 3.00 0.00 0 0 1 3
CUB 25.0 1568.0 0.51 56.8 36.7 −0.38 −0.39 3.00 3.00 3.00 0 0 1 3
PER 37.9 749.0 0.20 24.7 37.3 −0.35 −0.65 −1.00 3.00 1.00 0 0 1 3
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Table A2. Continued
7013 75Dif 75Corr Dum Dum Dum Dum
COUNTRY 75NT 70GDPpc GDPGR 75NTMAN 75UNTMAN Skill Skill 75POLT2 75XCONS 75INST Land Rich Ind Reg
BUR 3.6 503.9 0.72 0 0 0 4
CEY 6.0 851.4 0.87 4.1 3.9 0.02 0.21 0 0 0 4
CHI 3.3 530.0 0.10 −6.00 1.00 −2.50 0 0 0 4
EGY 7.4 648.7 0.77 0 0 0 4
IND 3.0 533.1 0.54 2.7 2.8 0.02 0.36 0 0 0 4
INDO 4.9 654.5 0.75 0 0 0 4
JAM 535.1 0.30 10.3 12.5 0.00 −0.20 0 0 0 4
JAP 8.3 737.4 1.48 0.0 0.0 1.00 7.00 4.00 0 0 0 4
MAR 563.0 0.54 5.7 9.2 0.02 −0.04 −6 1 0 0 0 4
PHI 7.8 776.0 0.71 0.0 0.0 0 0 0 4
SOU 857.9 1.46 8.1 9.0 0.00 −0.51 4.00 7.00 5.50 0 0 0 4
THA 3.0 712.0 0.39 0 0 0 4
TUN 632.7 0.78 4.6 7.3 0.01 −0.04 0 0 0 4
TUR 7.4 825.0 0.90 7.7 6.3 −0.02 −0.49 −10.00 1.00 −4.50 0 0 0 4
Recognition of variables used in Table A2
75NT Tariff average, 12 years from 1865 to 1875. Most of them came from Clements and Williamson’s (2001) database.
70GDPpc Maddison (2003) 1870 real per capita GDP.
7013GDPGR Acumulated rate of growth between 1870 and 1913.
75NTMAN Weighted industrial tariff of 1875, using total manufacture British export shares from database Appendix 2.
75UNTMAN Unweighted industrial tariff average from database Appendix 2.
75Dif Skil Calculated as the difference between the simple average of the ad valorem tariffs of the respective skill-intensive sectors (‘up cut-off’) and the non-skill-intensive
sectors (‘down cut off’) by country.
75CorrSkill Correlation between skill and tariff rankings of the industrial sector by country.
75POLT2 Range (numeric) = −10 to 10 (−10 = high autocracy; 10 = high democracy) in 1875.
75XCONS Executive constraints (numeric): operational (de facto) independence of chief executive in 1875.
75INST An average of 75XPOL2 and 75XCONS.
DumLand Dummy Land: Rich New Settlers = 1; the others = 0.
DumRich Countries with GDP per capita bigger than half UK in 1870 = 1; the others = 0.
DumInd Countries with independent commercial policy = 1; the others = 0.
DumReg Rich Europe = 1; rich land abundant = 2; poor independent countries = 3; poor dependent countries = 4.
Method and sources: see Section 4 of the text, and Appendix.
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Table A3. Matrix correlation between variables of Table A2
75DIFfSKILL 75NT 75UNTMAN 75XCONS
75DIFfSKILL 1.00 −0.87 −0.91 0.23
75NT −0.87 1.00 0.84 −0.23
75UNTMAN −0.91 0.84 1.00 −0.27
75XCONS 0.23 −0.23 −0.27 1.00
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